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Introduction
We have criticized the amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure since the 1980s and the procedural changes made by United
States Supreme Court decisions during the same period. 1 These
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1.

Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil
Procedure, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1839, 1877–89 (2014).
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amendments and changes, even if subtle and incremental, launched a
new era—the Fourth Era in the grand history of American civil procedure. In this era, tragically, litigation is often perceived as a nuisance,
trials are a mistake, and judicial case management is a catholicon.
In this Article, we turn our attention to state court procedure.
States could follow their federal counterparts; indeed, the pursuit of
uniformity can be instinctive. Yet this Article urges states to resist the
siren song of uniformity in favor of more noble pursuits.
The occasion for this Article is the most recent wave of amendments
to the Federal Rules which included (i) the abrogation of Rule 84 and
the forms; and (ii) the incorporation of proportionality into the scope
of discovery. Although these amendments, like many that preceded
them, restrict litigants’ access to court and also to evidence, it is not
obvious that these amendments are especially consequential. Such is
the nature of incremental reforms that are significant only when viewed
cumulatively and retrospectively. But Chief Justice Roberts described
the amendments as effecting a “significant change, for both lawyers and
judges, in the future conduct of civil trials.” 2 Accordingly, this seems
like an appropriate time to consider the extent to which states do and
should replicate federal procedure.
One argument in favor of replication would exalt the quality of the
federal amendment process. To be sure, federal procedural amendments
go through a lengthy process that includes review by the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules, the Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure (the “Standing Committee”), the Judicial Conference of the
United States, the United States Supreme Court, and finally, the
United States Congress. 3 These processes include not only public
hearings, but also periods during which the public is encouraged to
submit comments and offer testimony. 4 Such a lengthy and costly
process—one that would be difficult for states to duplicate—might
fairly be assumed to result in high quality amendments that states
should, in turn, replicate. Similarly, Supreme Court opinions are the
2.

John G. Roberts, Jr., 2015 Year-End Report on the Federal
Judiciary 5 (2015), http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/
2015year-endreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TV9-BAJT] (“The amendments
may not look like a big deal at first glance, but they are.”).

3.

Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–74) (detailing the federal
procedural amendment process); James C. Duff, Overview for the Bench,
Bar, and Public: The Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure, U.S.
Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/
how-rulemaking-process-works/overview-bench-bar-and-public [https://
perma.cc/ZU4T-P3WQ] (last visited Dec. 28, 2016).

4.

See generally Duff, supra note 3 (explaining the publication and public
comment process).
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product of deliberate and solemn processes. Procedural and other matters that are resolved by the Supreme Court have already been litigated
at trial and appellate courts, and Supreme Court cases are typically
briefed and argued by expert advocates. Allowing interest groups to file
amicus briefs further ensures a breadth and depth of judicial perspective. 5
Yet the quality of the federal rulemaking and decision-making
processes is not a persuasive justification for states to replicate the
federal model. The supposed superiority of these federal processes is, in
fact, suspect. 6 Twenty years ago the process of federal rulemaking was
under such intense criticism that the Standing Committee itself commissioned a self-study of the rulemaking process. 7 Recently, Professor
Richard Freer chronicled the persistence of many of those same criticisms, and identified new critiques, in his article, The Continuing
Gloom About Federal Judicial Rulemaking. 8 Observers are “gloomy” for
different and even apparently contradictory reasons: the rules committee acts in haste and is too slow; the committee fails to lead and
innovate on things that matter, and engages in irresponsible experiments; the committee is obsessed with trivial wordsmithing and is
dangerously politicized. 9 Unfortunately, these oppositional pairs of
criticism do not cancel each other out; instead, both halves are accurate,
depending on the year and the specific reform at issue. In the Conclusion, this Article rebuts any perception or presumption that any product of the federal rulemaking process is necessarily enlightened and
prudent.
Interpretations of procedural changes effected by Supreme Court
decisions are also suspect. Although recent empirical scholarship advises
skepticism about the role of ideology at the trial court level, there are
5.

See generally Katherine Shaw, Friends of the Court: Evaluating the
Supreme Court’s Amicus Invitations, 101 Cornell L. Rev. 1533 (2016)
(considering the influence of amicus briefs and their authors on Supreme
Court jurisprudence); Linda H. Edwards, Hearing Voices: Non-Party
Stories in Abortion and Gay Rights Advocacy, 2015 Mich. St. L. Rev.
1327 (2015) (detailing the influence of amicus briefs in the development of
abortion and LGBT rights).

6.

See generally Symposium, State Civil Procedure, 35 W. St. U. L. Rev. 255
(2007) (discussing class action litigation and the impact of state and federal
civil procedure codes).

7.

Daniel R. Coquillette, A Self-Study of Federal Judicial Rulemaking: A Report
from the Subcommittee on Long Range Planning to the Committee on Rules
of Practice, Procedure and Evidence of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, 168 F.R.D. 679, 683 (1995).

8.

Richard D. Freer, The Continuing Gloom About Federal Judicial
Rulemaking, 107 Nw. U. L. Rev. 447 (2013).

9.

Id. at 449 (collecting citations).
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“demonstrated political effects in Supreme Court decision-making.” 10
Accordingly, a state cannot replicate the Court’s changes to procedural
law for its own jurisprudence without also endorsing the ideology that
may be embedded in the reform. Of course, a state might share the
ideology and might desire the reform’s effect, but replication would not
be because of the superior quality of the decision-making by the Supreme Court. Replication would require a policy choice, and therefore,
hopefully, a policy debate.
Even if the rigor and wisdom of the amendment process is an insufficient reason for states to replicate their federal counterpart, one
might fairly suggest that uniformity—for its own sake—is reason
enough. Yet again we would disagree. To be sure, the idea of procedural
uniformity is seductive. Indeed, the idea is so deeply embedded in our
thoughts that many who advocate for uniformity find it difficult or
unnecessary to explain why it is thought to be good—as if it were some
excellence in itself. 11
Whether because of the lure of simplicity, the appearance of
neutrality, the likeness to science, the feel of efficiency, the
imprimatur of professionalism or some combination of these, the
norm of procedural uniformity enjoys virtually universal approval. Thus, it should come as no surprise that the rhetoric of
uniformity is both pervasive and predominant in the discourse of
procedural reform. 12

For example, procedural uniformity was a central theme of the reform
that led ultimately to the promulgation of the original Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 13
Part of the drafters’ promise of uniformity was the contemplated
adoption by states of the federal model. The Federal Rules were, after
10.

See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An
Institutional Approach, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1543 (2014) (considering “how
interactions and competition among institutions have produced the
contemporary state of federal civil litigation”); see also Thomas O. Main,
Procedural Constants: How Delay Aversion Shapes Reform, 15 Nev. L.J.
1597, 1601, 1601 nn.35–36 (2015) (collecting authorities) (recognizing
skepticism about ideology’s role in trial courts).

11.

See Thomas O. Main, Procedural Uniformity and the Exaggerated Role of
Rules: A Survey of Intra-State Uniformity in Three States That Have Not
Adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 46 Vill. L. Rev. 311, 311
(2001) (acknowledging the difficulty of explaining why procedural uniformity
is good).

12.

Id. at 311–12 (citations omitted).

13.

See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 909,
992 (1987) (recounting theoretical bases leading to the federal rule’s
reformation).
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all, “one of the greatest contributions to the free and unhampered administration of law and justice ever struck off by any group of men
since the dawn of civilized law.” 14 Further,
[t]hat state which tries to live unto itself will suffer, if it does not
perish . . . . [W]e are all for one and one for all . . . . [A] simple,
scientific, correlated system of rules, such as would be prepared
and promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United States,
would prove a model that would, for reasons of convenience as
well as of principle, be adopted by the states. 15

Replication by states of the Federal Rules would streamline both the
teaching and the practice of procedure. By mastering one set of procedural rules nascent lawyers would be prepared to practice in federal
and state courts. 16 But most states did not replicate the Federal Rules.
And as this Article explores more fully in Part II, even those states that
replicated the original Federal Rules have not kept pace with all of the
amendments.
Part II also explores other dimensions of uniformity. Another supposed virtue of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was both interdistrict and trans-substantive uniformity: the same procedural rules
would apply in all federal courts and to all types of substantive actions.
But as so often happens in life, when dreams or reforms confront reality,
the outcome falls short of the expectation.
Procedural uniformity under the Federal Rules regime has unraveled at every level, not least because the generality of the rules
ensured, in Professor Burbank’s apt description of trans-substantive
procedure, that there would be uniformity in only “the most trivial
sense.” 17 Specifically, judicial discretion and attorney latitude reigned,
undermining any meaningful role for the Federal Rules in a quest for
uniformity. 18 Under these circumstances it would be ironic—even
paradoxical—for a state to replicate the federal rules for the sake of
uniformity when the adopted text is so fluid and indeterminate that it
cannot maintain uniformity even with itself.
Of course, the Federal Rules and their amendments could be the
product of a flawed rulemaking process, fail to deliver on the promise
of uniformity, and yet still be compelling content that is suitable for
14.

B.H. Carey, In Favor of Uniformity, 3 F.R.D. 505, 507 (1943).

15.

Thomas Wall Shelton, A New Era of Judicial Relations, 23 Case &
Comment 388, 393 (1917).

16.

Subrin, supra note 13, at 974; see generally Janice Toran, ‘Tis a Gift to be
Simple: Aesthetics and Procedural Reform, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 352, 371–86
(1990) (discussing an aesthetic perspective in procedural rule reform).

17.

Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal
Rules and Common Law, 63 Notre Dame L. Rev. 693, 715 (1988).

18.

See infra notes 28–46 and accompanying text.
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adoption by the states. But it turns out that proponents of replication
at the state level would have to make a lot of assumptions that turn
out not to be true, namely that:
• the number, the substantive mix, and the stakes of federal and
state caseloads, respectively, are the same;
• the state courts have the judicial resources that federal procedure pre-supposes;
• the litigants in state courts can afford federal practice;
• the federal procedural amendments, whether by actual amendment or judicial decree, are working well for most cases;
• the drastic diminution of trials and juries in federal courts are
salutary for our democracy; and
• state court procedural experimentation should be discouraged.
The Conclusion reveals the misguided nature of these assumptions. This
Article will give examples of the mismatch of the federal amendments
for the state court caseload.
The Conclusion ends with a question for state court judges. Simply
put, what do you want your role as judges to be? The federal judiciary
has become a huge bureaucracy (judges represent only a small
percentage of the personnel) which has essentially given up on the major
role of adjudication. 19 They spend little time in the court room, and, on
average, “preside over a civil trial approximately once every three
months.” 20 They, and in large measure the lawyers who appear before
them, have had little experience with trials or with juries. They dispose
of cases on dispositive motions and urge settlement or alternative modes
of dispute resolution. 21 The American jury is disappearing, and to have
a trial is thought to be a judicial failure. 22 This is not hyperbole. We
hope that state judges avoid replicating this, and instead offer
alternative models.

I. The Lack of Uniformity
The drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure promised four
species of uniformity. Inter-district uniformity and trans-substantive
uniformity were to be realized from the moment of adoption. Intra-state
uniformity and then inter-state uniformity were to follow in due course.
Yet uniformity, whatever its rhetorical allure and supposed virtue, has
been elusive as a matter of fact.

19.

See infra notes 36–41, 124–160 and accompanying text.

20.

Main, supra note 10, at 1627.

21.

See infra notes 103–104, 176–179.

22.

See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
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A. Inter-District and Trans-Substantive Uniformity

With the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
1938, one set of procedural rules applied in all federal district courts
across the country. This effected so-called inter-district uniformity. This
uniform set of procedural rules replaced prior regimes of federal Process
Acts and Conformity Acts that had required federal courts, in cases at
law, to conform to the procedure of the state in which the federal court
sat. 23 Under the prior regimes, one federal court was applying the
common law procedure of its host state, while a federal court in another
state was applying the procedural codes of its host. Such divergence
was inconsistent with the emerging notion of a system of federal courts,
and reforms to make a uniform procedure for the federal courts found
traction. Notice, however, that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
replaced one species of procedural uniformity (i.e., a uniform procedure
within the state and federal courts of a state) with the pursuit of
another, to-wit, inter-district uniformity.
A second feature of these new, uniform Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was trans-substantive uniformity—all types of substantive actions were subject to the same procedural mandate. 24 In other words, no
matter whether the case was a simple slip-and-fall case or a complex
antitrust action, federal judges would apply one and the same textual
rule. 25 This, too, was a departure from prior regimes that tailored the
procedural mandates so that they were substance-specific. 26 The

23.

See generally Subrin, supra note 13, at 930 (explaining the difficulty of
deciding when to follow state or federal procedural rules); Stephen B.
Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1015, 1036–
43 (1982) (discussing the Process Acts and the Conformity Act of 1872 and
their influence on state and federal procedural law).

24.

See generally Edward Brunet, John Parry & Martin H. Redish,
Summary Judgment: Federal Law and Practice § 9:1 (3d ed. 2006)
(recounting the historical background of the trans-substantive nature of the
Federal Rules).

25.

See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive
Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2237,
2244–47 (1989) (responding to criticisms of the trans-substantive scope of the
Federal Rules); see also Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The
Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59 Brook. L. Rev. 761, 776–79 (1993)
(reviewing merits and demerits of trans-substantivity).

26.

See Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An
Essay on Adjusting the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 Denv. U. L.
Rev. 377, 379, 383 (2010) (recounting the different procedural systems used
in England and the inevitability of trans-substantive rules); Subrin, supra
note 13, at 915; Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary
Procedure, 78 Wash. L. Rev. 429, 455 (2003) (discussing common law
pleading).
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drafters urged trans-substantive rules for the purposes of “uniformity
and simplicity.” 27
The pursuit of trans-substantive uniformity—and, to some extent,
also the pursuit of inter-district uniformity—led the drafters to craft
rules that were elastic enough to apply in a broad range of circumstances and settings. “‘Tight will tear; Wide will wear’ was the sartorial
wisdom applied by the draftsmen.” 28 A related aspiration of the Federal
Rules was to vest judges with broad discretion; in a nutshell, the
drafters wanted to let the judges judge. 29 But this lack of restraint,
whatever its merits, means that there is a substantial amount of ad hoc
decision-making which, in turn, necessarily creates substantial disuniformity in practice.
Even a cursory review of the Federal Rules reveals the extent to
which the drafters (and amenders) rely on flexible standards, rather
than predictable rules. Put a different way, the Federal Rules often do
not set forth bright-line rules, but instead rely upon judicial interpretations. A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief;” 30 but what
exactly does that mean? Motions to amend require the judge to
determine “when justice so requires.” 31 A key inquiry in many class
actions is whether “questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate” over individual questions. 32 The scope of discovery includes that which is “relevant”—and, now, that which is “proportional
to the needs of the case.” 33 Of course, a judge may also order separate
trials “for convenience” or “to avoid prejudice.” 34 More examples are
plentiful. 35 The point here is simply that the Federal Rules frequently
postpone—or outsource—the procedural mandate to case-by-case
27.

Subrin, supra note 13, at 977. See also Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to
Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of
Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2067,
2081–85 (1988) (arguing in favor of trans-substantive rules and noting that
“procedural complexity defeats substantive rights”).

28.

Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy? Disunionism in the Federal
Courts, 45 Duke L.J. 929, 949 (1996) (quoting Francis Lieber, Legal
and Political Hermeneutics 195 n.6 (William G. Hammond ed., 3d ed.
1880)).

29.

See Subrin, supra note 13, at 944–48 (chronicling the extent to which the
Federal Rules were modeled on equity rather than common law antecedents).

30.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

31.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).

32.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

33.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b).

34.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b).

35.

E.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 1, 4(f)(3), 8(e), 11.
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determination; the virtue of such ad hoc decision-making comes at the
expense of uniformity.
Further, the profound significance of judicial case management on
the development and outcomes of cases is increasingly well-known.36
The Federal Rules require judges to manage their cases through
settlement conferences, status conferences, discovery conferences, and
pretrial conferences. 37 But other than establishing a basic agenda for
those conferences, the Federal Rules neither prescribe nor proscribe
judicial conduct that occurs in those conferences. The notion of outsourcing, again, is an apt metaphor for this notion that the Federal
Rules anticipate active judicial case management but do not circumscribe it.
Moreover, the disposition of cases while under case management
has made adjudication an increasingly opaque process. Gone are the
days when cases were resolved either by trial in a public courtroom or
by a voluntary settlement in the shadow of a trial. 38 Instead, an everexpanding constellation of actors earnestly manage cases toward settlement, toward disposition by motion, or for that rare one to two percent
of cases, toward a trial. 39 Importantly, the emergence of a judicial
bureaucracy attended this transformation of the judicial role: the number of senior judges, magistrate judges, law clerks, staff attorneys, and
externs expanded to assist judges whose duties were more focused on
managing cases, than on trying cases. 40 And because all of this occurs
beyond the reach of procedural rules, one might fairly assume that there
36.

See generally Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the
Thirty Years War, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1255, 1262–68 (2005) (chronicling “the
ascendance of a judicial ideology that commends intensive judicial case
management and active promotion of settlements”); Judith Resnik, Trial as
Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113
Harv. L. Rev. 924, 992–93 (2000) (discussing how the judiciary’s institutional and adjudicatory roles have blurred); Judith Resnik, Managerial
Judges, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 374, 414–31 (1982) (evaluating the techniques and
achievements of managerial judging).

37.

See generally Steven S. Gensler & Lee H. Rosenthal, The Reappearing
Judge, 61 U. Kan. L. Rev. 849 (2013) (discussing ways in which judges
are becoming more involved in cases outside of their chambers).

38.

See Main, supra note 10, at 1599 (explaining that judges often push cases
towards settlement from the onset).

39.

Id. at 1599.

40.

See generally Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 Yale
L.J. 1442, 1456 (1983) (“The proliferation of staff and subjudges and the
delegation of power to them weaken the judge’s individual sense of
responsibility.”). See also Stephen B. Burbank, S. Jay Plager & Gregory
Ablavsky, Leaving the Bench, 1970–2009: The Choices Federal Judges Make,
What Influences Those Choices, and Their Consequences, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1, 92–94 (2012) (documenting the contributions of senior judges).
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is substantial disuniformity across districts, and probably even among
the judges within a single district. 41
Even at the level of text, one can find a significant amount of disuniformity in procedural practice under the Federal Rules. Federal Rule
83 authorizes districts to adopt local rules, and these rules have the
force of law. 42 The “problem of divergence between local and national
rules” is persistent and consequential. 43 But local rules are only one
source of this problem. In the late 1980s, the rulemakers’ own inquiry
“found that quite a few additional requirements, variously denominated
general orders, standing orders, special orders, scheduling orders, or
minute orders, as well as individual judge practices” resulted in disparate practice across the system of federal courts. 44 The Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA) further complicated this picture, by
requiring each district to adopt a plan to address the expense and delay
of litigation; the CJRA unleashed “ninety-four amateur rulemaking
groups . . . [to] foment[] a nationwide procedural revolution that is probably unparalleled since the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1938.” 45 Critics have described how these reforms led to a
“balkanization” of procedure and turned federal practice into a veritable “Tower of Babel.” 46 Although the CJRA has technically reached
41.

See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 Mich. L.
Rev. 1463, 1474 (1987) (describing judicial discretion inherent in the Federal
Rules); Burbank, supra note 17, at 715 (arguing that ad hoc decision-making
sacrifices predictability); Stephen B. Burbank & Linda J. Silberman, Civil
Procedure Reform in Comparative Context: The United States of America,
45 Am. J. Comp. L. 675, 679 (1997) (noting criticism that discretion in the
Federal Rules prevents predictability and uniformity); Subrin, supra note 26,
at 391 (noting that discretion empowers judges to treat similar cases
differently).

42.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 83; Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 191 (2010).

43.

12 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 3153 (2d ed. 2014) (citing a 1991
article from a former Director of the Federal Judicial Center that referred
to “rampant inconsistency between local and national rules,” and noting
that “[p]olicing local divergences has proved difficult”).

44.

See Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform Sunset, 1998 U. Ill. L. Rev. 547,
555 (1998) (citing Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure,
Judicial Conference of the U.S., Report of the Local Rules
Project: Local Rules on Civil Practice (1989)); Daniel R. Coquillette
et al., The Role of Local Rules, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1989, at 62 (summarizing
the Local Rules Project).

45.

Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77
Minn. L. Rev. 375, 376–77 (1992).

46.

See generally Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of
Federal Civil Procedure, 24 Ariz. St. L.J. 1393, 1427 (1992) (recognizing
the balkanization of procedure resulting from rules); Mullenix, supra note
45, at 381 n.22 (crediting Professor Rosenberg as first to use the Tower of
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its sunset, the phenomenon of inter-district disuniformity persists, with
a number of “pilot projects” now also layered into federal practice and
procedure. 47
We have explained the level of generality demanded for transsubstantive rules, explained the broad discretion accorded trial judges,
and described the local tailoring of practice and procedure across the
federal system. The architects of a procedural system might fairly criticize or defend each of these choices. Our intention in this Part is simply
to establish that states cannot meaningfully replicate federal procedure
when the federal procedure itself boasts of an indeterminacy and flexibility that resists definition. After all, what can it mean to say that one
looks like Proteus? 48
B. Intra-State and Inter-State Uniformity

The drafters of the Federal Rules envisioned that states would
replicate this enlightened set of procedural rules. This anticipated conformity would run in the opposite direction of that which prevailed in
actions at law under the federal Process Acts and Conformity Acts,
when the federal courts followed the procedure of the state in which
they sat. 49 In the new regime, as soon as a state adopted the federal
model, there would be intra-state uniformity: lawyers and judges in that
state would be governed by the same procedural rules, whether they
were in federal or state court. And even more ambitiously, when all
states made this transition, there would be inter-state (or inter-system)
uniformity.

Babel metaphor for local rules). But see Carl Tobias, Fin-De-Siècle Federal
Civil Procedure, 51 Fla. L. Rev. 641, 659 (1999) (cautioning against
exaggeration of empirical data of balkanization).
47.

See, e.g., Laura McNabb, Pilot Project Reduces Delay and Cost in Federal
Litigation, 41 A.B.A. Sec. Litig., Spring 2015, at 55 (describing a pilot
project “designed to streamline pretrial discovery in certain employment
cases”); see also Electronic Discovery Special Masters, U.S. Dist. Court,
W. Dist. Pa., http://www.pawd.uscourts.gov/Pages/ediscovery.htm
[https://perma.cc/5SKS-538F] (last visited Oct. 9, 2016) (providing special
masters to assist on e-discovery); Judicial Improvements Comm. of the
S. Dist. of N.Y., Pilot Project Regarding Case Management
Techniques for Complex Civil Cases (2011), http://www.nysd.uscourts
.gov/rules/Complex_Civil_Rules_Pilot.pdf [https://perma.cc/G3ML-N7LP]
(last visited Oct. 9, 2016).

48.

Proteus was a Greek water god whose shape was, like the sea itself, in a
constant state of change. From this feature of Proteus is derived the
adjective protean, which means changing frequently and easily. Proteus, 2
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (5th ed. 2002).

49.

See, e.g., Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255 §§ 5–6, 17 Stat. 196, 197 (obligating
federal courts to follow state court procedure “as near as may be”).
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Two decades after the Federal Rules were promulgated, Charles
Clark, the principal drafter of the Federal Rules, wrote that “the trend
of state adoption [was] proceeding apace.” 50 At that point, “state
procedural systems were approximately evenly divided among procedural systems modeled on the Federal Rules, the common law and the
Field Code.” 51 By 1975, however, the pace of replication by states grew
to a virtual standstill. A comprehensive assessment of intra-state
uniformity was undertaken in 1986, when Professor John Oakley and a
former student, Arthur Coon, measured “the degree to which state
court civil procedure is now wrought in the image of the Federal
Rules.” 52 Although Oakley and Coon found a “pervasive influence of
the Federal Rules on at least some part of every state’s civil
procedure,” 53 they also “effectively eulogized the goal of intra-state
uniformity.” 54 Based upon a comprehensive, nine-variable examination
of all fifty states, the authors “were surprised to find that only a minority of states [had] embraced the system and philosophy of the Federal
Rules wholeheartedly enough to permit classification as true federal
replicas.” 55 Moreover, the authors found that lesser-populated states
50.

Charles E. Clark, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: 1938–1958: Two
Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 435, 435 (1958).

51.

Main, supra note 11, at 321 (citing William M. Barron & Alexander
Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 9.1–9.53 (Wright ed.,
1960)).

52.

John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A
Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 Wash. L. Rev. 1367,
1368 (1986). See also Main, supra note 11, at 383 (illustrating the difficulty
in achieving pure uniformity or uniformity of result).

53.

Oakley & Coon, supra note 52, at 1369.

54.

Main, supra note 11, at 322.

55.

Oakley & Coon, supra note 52, at 1369. Their nine criteria for “replica” status
included: “(1) state civil procedure is specified in judicially promulgated rules
rather than a statutory code; (2) these rules are organized and enumerated in
general conformity to the scheme of the FRCP; (3) there has been a merger
of law and equity into one form of civil action; (4) the substance of the state
rules of civil procedure conform generally to the federal joinder rules as
amended in 1966; (5) the substance of the state rules of civil procedure
conform generally to the federal discovery rules as amended in 1970; (6) the
state rules provide for summary judgment according to the model of the
Federal Rules; (7) the rules as written and interpreted provide without
qualification for the liberal conception of ‘notice pleading’ practiced in federal
courts under the aegis of Conley v. Gibson; (8) to the extent the terms of the
state rules or their interpretations are otherwise idiosyncratic or
unconventional by federal standards, such variation in practice is not at
bottom inconsistent with the Federal Rules’ philosophy of ‘procedure as the
handmaiden of justice’; and (9) the state courts regard precedent and
commentary construing counterpart provisions of the Federal Rules as
persuasive authority in the construction of the state rules.” Id. at 1374–75.
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represented a disproportionately large share of states that had adopted
the Rules: of the ten most populous states, only Ohio had modeled the
Federal Rules, and eleven of the fifteen least populous states were
replicas. 56 Even when a “looser test than replication was applied to
classify states as generally following the model of the Federal Rules, the
resulting tally embraced a majority of states but a minority of our
national population.” 57
In 2003, Professor Oakley took a second look at intra-state uniformity and found even less of it. 58 He concluded that the Federal Rules
were “less influential in state courts today than at anytime [sic] in the
past quarter-century” and that they “have lost credibility as avatars of
procedural reform.” 59 This decline of intra-state uniformity is not
because states that adopted the Federal Rules many decades ago are
adopting some alternative procedural system. Rather, it is because the
states do not adopt the amendments to the Federal Rules that have
been made in the ensuing years.
The number of amendments to the Federal Rules is striking, and is
increasing. 60 The original set of Rules took effect seventy-nine years ago.
In the first forty years of their history, they were amended five times.61
In the latter half of their history, the Federal Rules have been amended
an additional nineteen times. 62 About two-thirds of the Rules have been

56.

Id. at 1413, 1427–28.

57.

Id. at 1369.

58.

John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 Nev.
L.J. 354, 355 (2003).

59.

Id.

60.

See generally Main, supra note 26, at 480–81 (listing the years in which the
Federal Rules were substantially amended).

61.

The Rules were amended in 1948, 1961, 1963, 1966, and 1970. We are
ignoring technical amendments that were made in 1941, 1951, 1968, 1971,
1972, and 1975; if these were included in the tally, the Rules were amended
eleven times in their first thirty-nine years.

62.

The Rules were amended in 1980, 1983, 1985, 1991, 1993, 2000, 2001, 2002,
2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016. The
next set of proposed amendments, published for public comments, is already
in the queue. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial
Conference of the United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate, Bankruptcy, Civil, and
Criminal Procedure (Aug. 12, 2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/
file/20163/download [https://perma.cc/6NZ7-464W]. We are ignoring
technical amendments that were made in 1987, 1988, 1995, 1997, 1998, 1999;
if these were included in the tally, the Rules were amended twenty-five
times in the past thirty-nine years.
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amended at least four times. 63 In 2003, one of us wrote that “[o]nly ten
of the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have never been
amended.” 64 Four years thereafter, there were none. 65
Because even the so-called replica states seldom keep pace with
these amendments, intra-state uniformity steadily declines over time.
Not all of these amendments are significant, though. To get a better
sense of whether there was intra-state uniformity on the more significant matters, this Article focuses on six signature amendments to
the Federal Rules since 1983. Our admittedly arbitrary list included:
• the 1983 and 1993 amendments to Rule 11;66
• the 2003 amendments to Rule 23; 67
63.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 23, 24, 25, 26,
27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 41, 43, 44, 44.1, 45, 50, 52, 53, 54,
55, 56, 58, 60, 62, 65, 65.1, 66, 68, 69, 71.1, 72, 73, 77, 79, 81, 82, 84 & 86.

64.

Main, supra note 26, at 481.

65.

See Memorandum from Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Advisory Comm. on
Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, to Hon. David F. Levi, Chair, Standing
Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure 25–26 (June 2, 2006) (illustrating
that the 2007 Style Amendments altered every Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure). See generally Edward H. Cooper, Restyling the Civil Rules:
Clarity Without Change, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1761 (2004) (explaining
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Style Project aims to alter every rule);
Jeremy Counseller, Rooting for the Restyled Rules (Even Though I Opposed
Them), 78 Miss. L.J. 519, 520 (2009) (referring to the Style Amendments
as an unnecessary undertaking that created problems for lawyers and
judges); Freer, supra note 8, at 471–72 (arguing that “[a]mendments to the
Federal Rules should be like faculty meetings: rare and purposeful”).

66.

The 1983 amendment added bite to the certification obligations triggering
sanctions, and the 1993 amendment responded to the criticism that the 1983
amendments went too far. See generally Stephen B. Burbank, Am.
Judicature Soc’y, Rule 11 in Transition: The Report of the Third
Circuit Task Force on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (1989)
(presenting the findings of a task force created to analyze Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11); Jerold S. Solovy et al., Sanctions Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (1996) (addressing all Supreme
Court decisions that concerned sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11 from the 1983 to the 1993 Amendment); Carl Tobias, The 1993
Revision of Federal Rule 11, 70 Ind. L.J. 171 (1994) (reviewing and
examining the shortcomings of the 1983 amendments); Danielle Kie Hart, Still
Chilling After All These Years: Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and Its Impact on Federal Civil Rights Plaintiffs After the 1993
Amendments, 37 Val. U. L. Rev. 1, 3, 11 (2002) (discussing the 1983 and
1993 amendments).

67.

The 2003 amendments rewrote several sections of the class action rule,
including the timing of the class certification decision, the content of class
notices, the appointment of class counsel, and the judicial approval of
settlements. See generally Georgene Vairo, What Goes Around, Comes
Around: From the Rector of Barkway to Knowles, 32 Rev. Litig. 721, 765
(2013) (discussing the 2003 amendments to Rule 23); Symposium, Clear
Notices, Claims Administration, and Market Makers, 18 Geo. J. Legal
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• the 1993 and 2000 amendments to Rule 26; 68
• the 1991 amendment to Rule 48; 69
• the 1991 amendment to Rule 50; 70 and
• the 2003 amendment to Rule 51. 71
Because we were also curious about an amendment that happened much
earlier, this Article also examines a seventh event, namely:
• the 1966 amendment to Rule 15. 72
Ethics 1223 (2005) (noting Rule 23 amendment requiring plain-language
notices to potential class members).
68.

The 1993 amendment to the discovery rule introduced mandatory initial
disclosures, among other reforms. See generally Linda S. Mullenix,
Adversarial Justice, Professional Responsibility, and the New Federal
Discovery Rules, 14 Rev. Litig. 13 (1994) (discussing the controversial 1993
amendment to Rule 26(a)); Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study
of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule
Amendments, 39 B.C. L. Rev. 525 (1998) (considering the use of initial and
expert disclosures under the 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules). The
2000 amendments modified the mandatory disclosure obligation so that a
party need only disclose information supporting its claims rather than all
relevant information.

69.

The 1991 amendment to Rule 48 removed the presumption that juries
consisted of twelve members. See generally Richard S. Arnold, Trial by Jury:
The Constitutional Right to a Jury of Twelve in Civil Trials, 22 Hofstra L.
Rev. 1 (1993) (transcribing a speech in opposition to amendments to Rule 48
of the Federal Rules by the Chief Judge for the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit); Michael J. Saks, The Smaller the Jury, the
Greater the Unpredictability, 79 Judicature 263, 264 (1996) (explaining the
negative effects and consequences of smaller juries).

70.

The 1991 amendment to Rule 50 jettisoned the terms “directed verdict” and
“JNOV” or “judgment notwithstanding the verdict” in favor of “judgment
as a matter of law” and “renewed judgment as a matter of law,” respectively.
This was not a substantive change, but it is important terminology for
federal practice. The Advisory Committee’s Note explains that the
terminology was changed because the former terms concealed the close
relationship between the two motions. At the same time, however, the Note
suggested that parties who used the old terminology should not be penalized.
This change is one scholar’s example of needless wordsmithing by procedural
amendment. See Freer, supra note 8, at 470 (explaining the unnecessary
costs of changing Rule 50).

71.

The 2003 amendment to Rule 51 substantially rewrote the rule regarding
jury instructions. The amendment clarified that an objection must be made
on the record and it clarified when objections must be made. The
amendment rule permits plain error review even when a party fails to
properly object, provided the error affects substantial rights.

72.

The 1966 amendment to Rule 15 added the notice and mistake components
to the criteria for relation-back of amendments. Prior to the amendment the
rule allowed relation-back whenever the claim arose out of the same
transaction or occurrence as the pleaded claim. The prior rule, however, did
not express address amendments that added parties; the prior rule addressed
only amendments that added claims. See Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Excessive
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Although we do not claim these are necessarily the most important
amendments, each of the enumerated amendments effected a change
that might fairly be described as a signature event for the Federal Rules.
A snapshot of this research is attached in Exhibit A. The table
reveals that none of the twenty-three replica states has adopted all
seven of the signature amendments. In fact, only seven states have
adopted at least half of them. Because states have not adopted the
amendments to the Federal Rules, navigating the procedure in the state
courts is like walking through a time machine that transports one to an
earlier era of federal procedure. For example, in almost all of the replica
states, the class action rule is the Federal Rule circa 2003. In two of the
replica states, the rule on relation-back of amendments is essentially
the Federal Rule circa 1965. If one were to travel from New Mexico to
Arizona to Utah, one could sample practice under the text of three
different versions of Federal Rule 11, namely circa pre-1983, circa 1983–
1993, and circa post-1993, respectively. Yet all three of these states are
generally thought to be among the category of states that follow the
federal model. Again, this Article’s point is simple: there is not absolute
uniformity even in the so-called replica states.
This analysis of intra-state uniformity has focused on textual uniformity. This focus could be dangerously misleading. There is some
evidence that textually dissimilar rules may nevertheless be applied
uniformly in practice. 73 As one might well expect, a local culture can
have some assimilative effect on disparate textual mandates as judges,
lawyers, and other repeat actors influence the application of law. 74 This
would be especially likely in circumstances where the textual mandate
is not drafted with exactitude to constrain its application. Uniformity
in practice, even if not in form, could be good news in the sense that
procedure may not be as disuniform, chaotic or complex as it appears.
But if form and practice need not be aligned, then one must also ponder
the reverse, to-wit: that uniformity in practice may not follow naturally
from textual uniformity. And indeed, the same study that found a
similarity of pleading standards in three states notwithstanding the fact
that those states not had adopted the federal pleading rule also found
a surprising dissimilarity in summary judgment practice notwithstanding the fact that those same states had adopted the federal summary
judgment rule. 75 These findings suggest that both uniformity and disuniformity may ultimately be beyond the control of (textual) rulemakers.
History of Federal Rule 15(c) and Its Lessons for Civil Rules Revision, 85
Mich. L. Rev. 1507, 1515–21 (1987) (discussing the history of Rule 15(c)
and the impact of the 1966 amendment).
73.

Main, supra note 11, at 381–82.

74.

Id.

75.

Id.
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II. Additional Reasons Why Federal Procedural
Amendments and Judicial Procedural Changes Should
Not be Replicated by the States
A major reason for the states to replicate federal procedural law
would be to provide uniformity, making it easier for judges, lawyers,
law professors, and law students to master civil procedure by studying
and utilizing only one procedural regime. This Article has now explained why that rationale lacks merit. But there are multiple other
reasons why federal procedure is severely mismatched to state procedural needs.
A. The Drafters: A Lack of Neutrality and Vision Skewed
by Discovery in the “Big Case”

Since the mid-1970s, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been
amended and federal procedure altered by three different casts of
characters: the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, the majority of the
Supreme Court of the United States, and the judges on the federal
district courts. Fortunately, there has been a good deal of prior scholarship about all of them. Importantly, there is no evidence that any of
these three groups have the needs and concerns of state court judges,
lawyers, or litigants in mind. Indeed, it appears that these three groups
do not even represent the full range of federal court stakeholders.
Professors Stephen Burbank and Sean Farhang, two scholars who
are uniquely qualified to discuss the composition and disposition of
federal rulemakers, have meticulously analyzed the composition and
votes of members of the Advisory Committee and Supreme Court
Justices with respect to federal procedural rules and interpretations of
procedural statutes. 76 Burbank and Farhang examined every Advisory
Committee proposal affecting the private enforcement of rights that
was forwarded to the Standing Committee from 1960 to 2011. 77 There

76.

Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang & Herbert M. Kritzer, Private
Enforcement, 17 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 637, 656–61 (2013). See generally
Burbank & Farhang, supra note 10 (mapping the Supreme Court’s decisions
on private rights of action related to the Federal Rules); Stephen B. Burbank
& Sean Farhang, Federal Court Rulemaking and Litigation Reform: An
Institutional Approach, 15 Nev. L.J. 1559 (2015) (analyzing information
about Advisory Committee members and their proposals to amend the
Federal Rules). Professors Burbank and Farhang have collected much of
their work in Stephen Burbank & Sean Farhang, Rights and
Retrenchment: The Counterrevolution against Federal
Litigation (Cambridge Univ. Pr. 2017) (forthcoming).

77.

Burbank & Farhang, Federal Court Rulemaking and Litigation Reform: An
Institutional Approach, supra note 76, at 1576–1580. Proposed changes in the
Federal Rules are suggested to the Advisory Committee by committee
members, judges, lawyers, interest groups, citizens, and other individuals and
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were twenty-nine such proposals, which covered thirty-nine separate
items. 78 They found that “[f]rom 1991 through 2011, the net balance
favored defendants in every year in which a proposal was made.” 79 The
current “predicted probability that a proposed amendment would favor
plaintiffs” is an astonishing zero. 80
From 1960 to 2013, there have been a number of trends in the
composition of the Advisory Committee that go a long way toward
explaining the current pro-defendant bias. The original Advisory
Committee that started meeting in 1934 and drafted the initial Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure was composed entirely of practitioners and
academics. “In the last quarter century, judges have constituted a
majority of the Committee in every year.” 81 The Advisory Committee
members are appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The
Chief Justices have all been appointed by Republican presidents since
1971, and the judicial appointees to the Advisory Committee have been
disproportionately appointed by Republican presidents. Burbank and
Farhang put it this way: “The probability of committee appointment
or reappointment of judges appointed to the bench by Republican
presidents is about 1.5 times larger than that of Democratic appointees.” 82 Party affiliation need not influence patterns of behavior when
it comes to the choice of procedural rules, but it would be startling if
ideology were not relevant when judges are in effect acting in a legislative, rather than judicial, capacity. 83
There has also been a shift in the ideology of practitioners on the
Advisory Committee. Burbank and Farhang demonstrate that since the
1990s the practitioners have shown a substantial shift toward corporate/business representation. 84 Their research is consistent with what
Alan Morrison of the Public Citizen Litigation Group observed decades
ago: the rulemaking committees include fewer lawyers than in the past,
and the lawyers who are named to the committee “are predominantly
from large firms, principally people who represent defendants.” 85
organizations. For an overview of the rulemaking process, see Duff, supra note
3.
78.

Burbank & Farhand, Federal Court Rulemaking and Litigation Reform: An
Institutional Approach, supra note 76, at 1576–77.

79.

Id. at 1579.

80.

Id. In the early 1960s, there was an eighty-eight percent chance that a
proposed amendment would favor plaintiffs. Id.

81.

Id. at 1568.

82.

Id. at 1576.

83.

Id. at 1571–72.

84.

Id. at 1591.

85.

Id. at 1588 (citing Rules Enabling Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the
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In a carefully documented article on the amendment to the Federal
Rules in 2000 that attempted to limit the scope of discovery under Rule
26, Professor Jeffrey Stempel demonstrated how every stage of the
amendment process from the Advisory Committee through the Standing Committee and Judicial Conference was strongly influenced by a
pro-corporate defendant bias and that elite attorneys, largely representing large corporations, were highly influential in proposing the amendment and getting it passed. 86 When that amendment was approved by
the Judicial Conference, the chair of the rulemaking committee celebrated this “extremely good news” in a memo to the American College
of Trial Lawyers (ACTL), a bar interest group “that had spent
‘thousands of hours’ lobbying for it.” 87 That memo also noted that
credit was due to a member of the ACTL who sat on the Advisory
Committee when it was considering the proposal. 88
More recently, Patricia Hatamyar Moore offered an incisive critique
of the substance of the 2015 amendments and the rulemaking process
that produced them. 89 Moore exposed the emptiness of the rulemakers’
contention that the amendments were supported by empirical evidence. 90 Specifically, the rulemakers relied on subjective opinion surveys
and ignored the objective evidence. 91 Moore also revealed the systematic
preference for defendants’ viewpoints and the relative silencing of plaintiffs’ voices. 92 Specifically, the perspective of plaintiffs and their lawyers
were underrepresented on the rulemaking committee and at the hearings. 93
The drafters of amendments at the Advisory Committee level
largely operate under the influence of the massive and expensive dis-

Judiciary, 98th Cong. 29 (1985) (statement of Alan Morrison, Director, Pub.
Citizen Litig. Grp.)).
86.

Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking:
Errors of Scope, 52 Ala. L. Rev. 529, 610–11 (2001).

87.

Burbank & Farhang, Federal Court Rulemaking and Litigation Reform: An
Institutional Approach, supra note 76, at 1592 (citing Memorandum from
Robert S. Campbell, Jr., to the Members of the Fed. Civil Procedure Comm.,
Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers 1, 3 (Sept. 16, 1999) (on file with authors)).

88.

Id.

89.

Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, The Anti-Plaintiff Pending Amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Pro-Defendant Composition
of the Federal Rulemaking Committees, 83 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1083 (2015).

90.

Id. at 1087.

91.

Id. at 1090–91.

92.

Id. at 1086–87.

93.

Id. at 1098–99.
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covery that often takes place in extremely large or complex civil litigation. 94 Numerous studies have repeatedly shown that in the vast
majority of cases there is either no discovery or discovery that is proportionate to the stakes involved in the litigation. 95 Perhaps five to
fifteen percent of the cases, predominantly complex litigation, have
enormous and expensive discovery. 96 But the multiple amendments to
the federal rules attempting to curtail discovery, including mandatory
discovery, limitations on numbers, limitations on scope (most recently
the proportionately amendment), and increased case management
apply to all cases, the vast majority of which were not a problem. As
discussed in Part B below, the state court civil case load does not include a large number of these huge cases, and in Part C below the
amendments have not been wise for even the federal case load. We and
others have written at great length previously how the myth of widespread litigation abuse has been perpetuated by the business and antiregulation communities, distorting the dialogue about procedural reform. 97
A majority of the Supreme Court’s pleading, summary judgment,
class action, compulsory arbitration, and justiciability jurisprudence,
starting in the 1980s, has been similarly influenced by a mindset that
assumes, without empirical support, that civil litigation is in some sense
“out of control” and infused with discovery abuse. 98 In the Twombly
and Iqbal decisions, heading back in the direction of fact pleading, the
Court explicitly references massive discovery as a rationale for more
rigorous pleading requirements. 99 Again, trans-substantive procedure
plays a part in the mismatch of the rule change that must apply to all
federal civil litigation—large, medium, and small.
There is an enormous amount of procedural scholarship demonstrating that a central tenet of the Rehnquist and Roberts Supreme
Courts has been anti-civil litigation, anti-rights enforcement, and anti94.

See, e.g., Bryant G. Garth, Two Worlds of Civil Discovery: From Studies of
Cost and Delay to the Markets in Legal Services and Legal Reform, 39 B.C.
L. Rev. 597 (1998) (discussing research into the cost of litigation, including
the expenses associated with discovery).

95.

Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at 1850 n.61.

96.

Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Giving the “Haves” a Little More: Considering the
1998 Proposals, 52 SMU L. Rev. 229, 248 (1999); Suja A. Thomas &
Dawson Price, How Atypical Cases Make Bad Rules: A Commentary on the
Rulemaking Process, 15 Nev. L.J. 1141, 1147–49 (2015).

97.

Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at 1869–972.

98.

Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice Reform:
Its Fallacies and Functions, 90 Or. L. Rev. 1085 (2012).

99.

See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558–60 (2007); Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 670, 672, 674, 678–79 (2009).
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government regulation. 100 Burbank and Farhang again use precise and
careful empirical research to demonstrate the conservative ideology behind Supreme Court decisions impacting and reducing the private enforcement of rights. 101 Whether one agrees with these trends or not, it
would be difficult to argue that they are non-ideological and balanced.
The federal district courts’ influence on procedural change is more
nuanced, in that appointees of both Republican and Democratic administrations moved in the direction of curtailing the right to trial
through the use of pre-trial procedures. 102 The most noteworthy incursions have been through the use of judicial case management in which
district court judges urge settlement and the use of Alternative Dispute
Resolution methods. 103 Again, discovery was often said to require
judicial constraints; the judicial control through case management was
also predicated on burgeoning federal case loads, although the number
of newly-filed federal civil cases each year has been nearly constant for
the past three decades. 104 After the case management development had
already occurred, it was encapsulated in the Amendment to Rule 16,
enlarging the topics to be covered during pretrial conferences. As noted
in Part C, this is very relevant to state court adoption, because multiple
conferences have been added, each capable of increasing expense in the
vast majority of cases that require no or little judicial management—
another reason to be cautious about state court replication.
100. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court,
and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal
Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 286, 309–10 (2013) (discussing the
“deformation” of civil procedure in federal courts); A. Benjamin Spencer,
The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 353, 368
(2010) (“The Supreme Court’s capitulation to defendant requests for more
stringent pleading standards in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft
v. Iqbal is the clearest evidence of procedure’s tilt towards restrictiveness.”).
For a close look at how that philosophy informs recent procedural
rulemaking, see Moore, supra note 89 (discussing how federal rulemaking
committee members appointed by Chief Justice Roberts influenced recent
procedural amendments limiting discovery).
101. Burbank & Farhang, supra note 10, at 1570–80.
102. The federal courts of appeals also played some role in the anti-litigation and
anti-trial jurisprudence that pervaded the federal courts starting in the mid1970s, and expanding in the 1980s. Some of the Circuit Court decisions
anticipated Supreme Court anti-plaintiff jurisprudence. For instance, the
requirement of more rigorous pleading in municipal liability cases, in order to
protect official immunity by foreclosing discovery at the pleading stage, was
duplicated in Iqbal, which insulated federal officials from discovery by
dismissing the case due to inadequate pleading.
103. See Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at 1853–54, 1861–67 (discussing strategies
courts use to resolve cases early in the litigation process).
104. See Main, supra note 10, at 1600 & n.26.

521

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 2·2016
Braking the Rules
B. The Differences Between State and Federal Civil Caseloads

This Article has shown that many members of the federal Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules and the majority of the Supreme Court had
a vision of the role of civil litigation that may not correspond to the
preferences and needs of state courts. This is particularly true because
of their focus on big cases and the large amounts and costs of discovery
in such cases. It makes sense to ask whether the bulk of civil cases
commenced in state courts require the emphasis on reigning in discovery
that might be appropriate in large, complex cases. We think that this
emphasis was misguided at the federal level, because even there most
cases did not and do not have disproportionate discovery to the stakes
involved in the case. 105 The mismatch is even more pronounced when
one compares the civil caseloads of state and federal courts.
Before looking at some comparative data, it is perhaps helpful to
remember that Charles Clark, the Reporter to the original Advisory
Committee, who was a principal draftsman of the 1938 Federal Rules,
said all along that even the civil caseloads of the federal courts might
require different procedures for simple and complex cases. “In studying
the business of the federal courts, he noted that the docket had simple
diversity cases, as well as increasing numbers of cases in which the
government was a party. He suggested that some sorting mechanism
might be required.” 106 The differences between the state and federal
dockets are equally stark, and probably more so.
Although it is difficult to obtain state court data that is kept in a
uniform way throughout the states and that reflects the state courts in
the entire nation, the National Center for State Courts conducted a
survey for civil cases (excluding domestic relations matters) disposed of
during the fiscal year ending in June 30, 2013 in ten of the forty-five
counties that participated in all four iterations of previous Civil Justice
Surveys of State Courts. These were urban counties in ten diverse states
and the attempt was to choose counties that together were representative of state litigation in the country. “The 925,344 cases comprise
approximately five percent (5%) of state caseloads nationally.” 107
In civil state court cases resulting in a judgment, the monetary
values are relatively modest, with a mean amount of $9,267 and the
105. See supra note 96 (examining the social and political reasons for enacting an
amendment limiting the scope of discovery in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
106. Stephen N. Subrin, Charles E. Clark and His Procedural Outlook: The
Disciplined Champion of Undisciplined Rules, in Judge Charles Edward
Clark 115, 148 (Peninah Petruck ed., 1991).
107. Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, The Landscape of Civil Litigation
in State Courts iii (2015), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/
Research/CivilJusticeReport-2015.ashx [https://perma.cc/7JPP-VBNC].
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50th interquartile range of $2,441. 108 Only 0.2% of the cases had judgments in excess of $500,000. 109 The authors of the report note that although debate concerning criticism of the American civil justice system
focuses on high-value tort and commercial contract disputes, they
“comprised only a small proportion” of the survey caseload. 110 They
blame the misperceptions about state court civil litigation on the media
emphasis on federal high-value and complex litigation, and perhaps on
the experience of repeat player lawyers with such cases. They note, as
does this Article, the problems of using the same procedures for all
cases, and state that their findings make clear that “very few cases need
as much time or attention as the rules provide and, ironically, many of
them likely take longer and cost more to resolve as a result.” 111
One difference between the federal and civil dockets is, of course,
based on what subject matter jurisdiction has been allocated to federal
district courts. 112 That the federal caseload is primarily based on federal
question cases, diversity cases in which the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, and cases in which the United States is a party, already
distinguishes the federal district court docket. Then, too, there are cases
of exclusive federal jurisdiction, such as cases arising out of bankruptcy,
patents and copyright, admiralty, and the Sherman Antitrust law.
Excluding bankruptcy, because such cases are not brought in federal
district courts, other examples of exclusive federal jurisdiction are apt
to be complex and large, with the possible exception of admiralty.
But the more normal docket of the federal courts is also a good deal
different from that of the state trial courts. There is much more data
about federal cases, but here, too, there are empirical difficulties in the
compilation and categorization of data. 113 Nonetheless, the state survey
and a recent article by Professor Hatamyar Moore on federal district
court civil caseload data for 2012–2013 114 permit us to be certain that
the state and federal civil dockets are substantially different. Here are
a few examples of the differences. The top six categories of federal civil
case filings in 2013 were tort (twenty-four percent), prisoner (twenty
percent), civil rights (twelve percent), contract (nine percent), social
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 36.
112. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331–40 (2012) (providing the rules for subject matter
jurisdiction).
113. See, e.g., Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, The Civil Caseload of the Federal
District Courts, 2015 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1177, 1183–84, 1198, 1208–09 (2015)
(discussing several empirical studies, including their flaws and findings).
114. Id.
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security (seven percent), and labor (six percent). 115 Although, as previously mentioned, both the federal and state data pose categorization
problems that inevitably make comparisons imperfect, there are still
undeniable differences that indicate that the caseloads are by no means
similar.
In state courts, tort cases represent seven percent of the docket
compared to twenty-four percent in federal court, 116 and contract cases
represent sixty-four percent of the docket compared to nine percent in
federal court 2003 amendments to Rule 23. 117 Moreover, it is quite clear
that the state contract cases are not usually complex. Thirty-seven
percent of them are debt collection, twenty-nine percent are landlordtenant, and seventeen percent are foreclosure cases. 118
It is also significant that there are huge variations among the
counties in the diverse states in the state survey. For instance, in Cook
County, Illinois, eighty-two percent of the cases are contract and five
percent are small claims; in Marion County, Indiana, eight percent are
contract and eighty-two percent are small claims. Cook County has ten
percent tort cases and Santa Clara County, California has nine percent
tort cases, while Maricopa County, Arizona has one percent tort
cases. 119 Such variations reveal important differences between state and
federal courts, between and among states, and even within a state. Each
may have distinct procedural needs. And, of course, different types of
cases within a state or county might best be dealt with through different
procedures. This is further discussed in Section E, which specifically
deals with the importance of state experimentation.
Another way of looking at the differences between the state and
federal dockets is to consider the amount of time that given cases, on
average, require. The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AO)
“has devised a system of ‘weights’ to apply to different types of cases,”
dependent on an estimate of the amount of time judges will be likely to
spend on such cases. 120 “The average civil case is weighted about 1.0,
which the AO calculates is about 441 minutes.” 121 Many of the highest
ratings are for Death Penalty Habeas Corpus (12.89), Environmental
Matters (4.79), Civil RICO (4.78), Civil Rights Voting (3.86), and

115. Id. at 1209.
116. Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, supra note 107, at 18.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 19.
119. Id. at 18.
120. Hatamyar Moore, supra note 113, at 1191 (citations omitted).
121. Id.
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Antitrust (3.45) cases; none of these show up at all as separate categories in the state survey. 122 Obviously, state courts can have some extremely large and complex cases, and these may be best served by the
full panoply of procedural steps that have become the norm in federal
court. But just as it makes little sense to apply such ample and expensive procedure (largely introduced through rule amendments and judicial opinions since 1980) to all types of federal cases, it surely makes
little sense for the less well-staffed and less well-funded state courts123
to follow suit.
C. Ineffective and Unwise Amendments at the Federal Level

In our earlier paper The Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure,
we explained that the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
predicated on a vision of simplicity and ease of access to the courts.124
Some of the ways this was accomplished were through liberal pleading
requirements, ease of amendment, broad discovery, and more expansive
joinder. Lawyers were given great latitude to craft their cases as they
saw fit. The idea was to have civil cases decided on the merits, either
through settlement, informed by needed discovery, or trial, having
eliminated through pleading and discovery those issues that were not
in dispute. 125 Motions to dismiss at the pleading stage or through summary judgment were extremely rare. 126 We called this original Federal
Rule jurisprudence “the third era”; the eras characterized by common
law and code pleading were the first and second, respectively.
We have no illusions that the Third Era was perfect. In fact, we
have noted that the liberality of this era, inviting some overreaching by
some lawyers in some cases, inevitably led to a backlash and attempts
to reign in the wide-openness of that Third Era procedure—both by
amending rules and by boldly reinterpreting extant rules. 127 But that
response (establishing some of the hallmarks of this present Fourth Era)
has not addressed the problems of cost and delay in big (or small) cases,
and has exacerbated problems of access and fairness for ordinary cases.
Importantly, then, for states with caseloads that feature large numbers
of routine cases, the procedures and judicial reinterpretations of the
federal courts are an especially poor fit.
Here are some examples. Many of the Fourth Era changes to federal
procedure add steps that apply, or can apply, to most cases. These
122. Id.
123. See infra Part II.D.
124. Subrin & Main, supra note 1.
125. Id. at 1845–46.
126. Id.
127. See id. at 1858–59, 1859 n.100.
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include required initial disclosure, discovery conference, scheduling conference, pre-trial conference, providing expert opinions, providing lists
of witnesses and their testimony, and meetings or discussions among
lawyers before conferences and motions. 128 These all involve time and
expense for lawyers, and often for their clients. The more rigorous
pleading requirements dictated by Twombly and Iqbal 129 include two
increased expenses: the expense that must go into the drafting of the
complaint, and the expense required in bringing and litigating (often
through lengthy briefs) the motion to dismiss. The increased use of
summary judgment in federal courts, memorialized in the famous
trilogy of Supreme Court cases, increases the need for discovery and,
more importantly, leads to extensive preparation and use of affidavits
and expensive preparation of briefs. 130 In addition, of course, is the preparation and presentation of oral arguments, to the extent that they are
permitted.
Each time a change is made in the scope of discovery provisions,
allegedly in an attempt to reduce discovery, there is increased incentive
to bring motions attacking alleged violations of the rules. This was true
when the definition of what is permitted was altered in 2000 (eliminating “subject matter”) and in the recent amendment, adding a proportionality requirement (and thus increasing the plaintiff’s burden) for
all discovery. Amendments to Rule 11 (first in 1983, and somewhat
liberalized in 1990) also provided an invitation for motions seeking
sanctions—again, usually against plaintiffs. 131
There are five major reasons why the shift to the Fourth Era of
American Civil Procedure was unwise. First, it was unsupported by
data. The allegations that civil litigation in America is out of control is
not borne out by facts. There is no evidence that discovery is excessive
in the majority of cases. 132 There is no evidence that a substantial number of cases brought by lawyers are frivolous. 133 There is no evidence
128. E.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a).
129. See supra note 99 (raising the pleading standard to one of “plausibility”).
130. See Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at 1851 & n.69 (explaining how judicial
decisions transforming summary judgment into the “focal point of
litigation” resulted in inefficient litigation).
131. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil
Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1925, 1957–62
(1989) (discussing amendments to Rule 11); Burbank, Am. Judicature
Soc’y, supra note 66, at 57, 65, 67–68 (noting the disproportionate
incidence of Rule 11 motions for sanctions on plaintiffs and their counsel).
132. See Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at 1850–51, 1887 & nn.61–63 (collecting
authorities) (disclaiming the popular narrative that discovery is often
excessive and costly).
133. See id. at 1887 & n.281 (collecting authorities) (stating that the Fourth Era
has eliminated frivolous cases that may have otherwise gone to trial).
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that Americans are litigious; in fact, the opposite is true. 134 Most Americans do not litigate harms to them. 135 There is no evidence of widespread misuse of punitive damages. 136 There is no evidence that juries,
by and large, are irresponsible. 137 There is no evidence that most cases
take too long. 138 There is no evidence that case management by judges
is effective, other than setting and keeping firm dates for the conclusion
of discovery and for trial. 139 There is, however, substantial evidence that
the business community, and those of a conservative persuasion, set out
to discredit plaintiff lawyers, civil litigation, and juries and endeavored
to have conservative judges appointed to the federal courts—and that
they succeeded. 140
Second, trans-substantive procedure, having the same procedures
available for all civil cases, regardless of substance or stakes, is pernicious. The Fourth Era procedure, for the most part, applies to large,
medium, and small cases in federal court. This needlessly adds expense.
There is substantial evidence that it is considerably more expensive to
try the same type of case in federal court than in state court. 141
Third, Fourth Era procedure wastes judicial time. The data is
startling.

134. See id. at 1887 & nn.276–77 (collecting authorities) (providing evidence that
Americans today are not more litigious than Americans in the past and
other nations).
135. See id. at 1885 & n.259 (collecting authorities) (explaining the judiciary’s
desire to resolve cases before trial).
136. See id. at 1887 & n.281 (collecting authorities) (“[P]unitive damages are
infrequently awarded, are generally modest in size, and have not increased
substantially over time.”).
137. See id. at 1883 & n.248 (collecting authorities) (stating that multiple studies
indicate jurors take their jobs seriously).
138. See id. at 1887 & n.278 (collecting authorities) (providing that most cases
are resolved in a year or less); Main, supra note 10, at 1612–15 (demonstrating the relative constancy since 1963 of the time from filing to
termination in the median case, the big case, and the small case).
139. See Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at 1886 & n.270 (collecting authorities)
(providing that although there are numerous case management strategies,
the most effective are setting cut-off dates to end discovery and firm trial
dates).
140. See id. at 1869–75 (collecting authorities) (providing a brief history of the
conservative movement in law schools, which bled into the federal judiciary).
141. See Herbert M. Kritzer et al., Courts and Litigation Investment: Why Do
Lawyers Spend More Time on Federal Cases?, 9 Just. Sys. J. 7, 12, 15
(1984) (detailing the significant differences between the rules of procedure in
federal and state courts).
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The number of [civil] cases decided ‘without court action’ [in
federal court] has fallen from fifty-three percent in 1963 to nineteen percent in 2012. Thus, although fourth era judges seldom try
cases, they are performing some ‘court action’ at a rate that is
almost three times the baseline [1963] amount. This means that,
assuming everything else were held constant, in thirty-four
percent of contemporary [federal civil] cases the courts expend
precious judicial resources on matters that the third era resolved
without any court action at all. Moreover, the fourth era is no
faster at resolving cases than was the third era. 142

Fourth, and this is perhaps the most galling, the cases that most
require judicial case management and constraints are the massive, high
stakes, complex cases that have enormous amounts of discovery. The
Fourth Era procedure in federal court puts many limitations on the
amount of each type of discovery, and, as we have seen, requires
multiple conferences and other requirements. But in most of the provisions the parties, according to the Federal Rules, can agree to opt
out. 143 And this they usually do in the large and complex cases that the
procedures were designed to control. Consequently, the federal courts
have added constraints and often extra expense for all cases, based on
the evidence of abuse in large cases alone, and much of the constraint
is not applying to those large cases. There is no evidence that the
amendments to the Federal Rules, whether through the formal process
or by judicial opinions, have made much of a dent in the massive
discovery and large expense and time that are associated with the large,
complex case. 144

142. Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at 1886; see also Main, supra note 10, at
1618–27 (evidencing the differences between the various eras in the
procedure and handling of cases).
143. See Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at 1850 & n.62 (collecting authorities)
(observing that parties may opt out of complex discovery to avoid high
costs).
144. It is true that in both Twombly and Iqbal dismissals at the complaint stage
have eliminated discovery. The first was a country-wide anti-trust case and
the second involved high ranking federal officials. We have seen no evidence
that these are typical; in fact, some scholarship has suggested that it would
have been wise for the Supreme Court to base its more rigorous pleading
requirements on the uniqueness of this type of anti-trust case under federal
substantive law and on official liability doctrine, thus foreclosing the transsubstantive effect of the decisions.

528

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 2·2016
Braking the Rules

Fifth, much of Fourth Era civil procedure increases judicial discretion. As discussed above, these rules provide very little or no guidance for lawyers. 145 Moreover, cognitive biases by judges, notwithstanding good intentions, have already proven to be inevitable. 146 Much
of Fourth Era procedure has negatively impacted plaintiffs more than
defendants, especially in civil rights cases. 147 One price of transsubstantive procedure is that drafters are forced to use wide-open, nondefining language, so that it applies to complex, large cases. This in
turn impacts smaller ones, which comprise the bulk of the docket. As
discussed below in Part E, the state courts have already found ways to
craft more defining rules, thus aiding lawyers and judges by providing
more predictability and less discretion than are fostered by current
federal procedure.
D. Changes in Federal Civil Procedure Require Judicial Resources
Not Available in State Courts

As Judge Richard Posner has explained in his study of the federal
courts, “there is no doubt that the average conditions of employment
in state judicial systems are inferior to those in the federal system.”148
One visual manifestation is the proliferation of new, expensive, and
large federal courthouses built in the past several decades; this construction presents a stark contrast to the many aging state court buildings. 149 Of even more importance is the enormous growth of federal
judicial personnel that provide aid to the relatively small number of
federal Article III judges. 150 Writing in 1996, Posner explained that
“[s]ince 1960, the total number of Article III judges has not quite
145. See supra notes 24–35 and accompanying text (noting aspects of vagueness
and lack of clarity in the rules under the various reforms).
146. See Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at 1879 & nn.228–229 (collecting
authorities) (“There is an abundance of evidence of cognitive biases and
illusions to which we know judges are not immune.”).
147. Id. at 1847–49, 1854 & nn.40–45, 51, 55, 58, 82 (collecting authorities).
148. Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Challenge and Reform
37 (1996).
149. See Judith Resnik, Building the Federal Judiciary (Literally and Legally):
The Monuments of Chief Justices Taft, Warren, and Rehnquist, 87 Ind.
L.J. 823 (2012) (detailing the funding and construction of the immaculate
federal court buildings). See generally Judith Resnik & Dennis Curtis,
Representing Justice: Invention, Controversy, and Rights in
City-States and Democratic Courtrooms (2011) (providing an indepth history of courts and their iconology around the world).
150. See Judith Resnik, The Federal Courts and Congress: Additional Sources,
Alternative Texts, and Altered Aspirations, 86 Geo. L.J. 2589, 2601–10
(1998) (describing the relationship of federal judicial power and the
personnel who aid the judges in exercising it).
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tripled, while the total number of federal judicial employees has increased approximately fivefold.” 151 In fact, “[j]udges’ salaries and fringe
benefits were 20 percent of the federal judicial budget in 1960 but only
9 percent in 1980.” 152
Federal judicial personnel include legions of secretaries, full time
clerks, full time attorney assistants, and magistrate judges. 153 Moreover,
there are multiple law student interns and growing numbers of special
masters. 154 Federal judges on senior status provide a substantial amount
of further judicial assistance. 155 Between 1986 and 2013, full time
magistrate positions increased twenty-eight percent. 156 By 2012, there
were 541 full-time magistrate judges aiding the 602 sitting federal
district court judges. It is conservatively estimated that senior judges
carry a workload that is twenty-five percent of the work of active
judges. 157
All of this person-power at the federal level is essential for carrying
out the roles required of federal district court judges under current
procedure. It makes little sense for most under-funded and under-staffed
state courts to attempt to replicate all of the conferences and motions
mandated or allowed by the Federal Rules. Nor is the active case
management that is the norm in federal court a good idea for the bulk
of state civil litigation. This is true for two major reasons: first, there
is no evidence that such management is needed or helpful for most cases
(except for setting and keeping firm discovery cut-off and trial dates158)
and second, such case management requires time that can be spent on
other judicial functions.
The dearth of state judicial resources compared to the federal courts
is particularly unfortunate given the caseloads confronting state judges.
Posner points out that although state “judges have less staff support
than federal judges,” the state courts of general jurisdiction “have on
average almost three times as many civil cases on their docket and
almost six times as many criminal cases as federal district judges,
151. Posner, supra note 148, at 8.
152. Id. at 8–9.
153. See supra note 40 (explaining why the addition of staff weakens judges’ sense
of responsibility).
154. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 148, at 9 (citing Linda Silberman, Judicial
Adjuncts Revisited: The Proliferation of Ad Hoc Procedure, 137 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 2131, 2151 (1989)) (noting the increase in the use of special masters
to reduce pre-trial burdens).
155. See Burbank, Plager & Ablavsky, supra note 40.
156. Hatamyar Moore, supra note 113, at 1188 (citations omitted).
157. Id.
158. Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at 1886.
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although the average state court case is shorter and easier than the
average federal court case.” 159 Moreover, many state court judges, unlike
their federal counterparts, must campaign and raise money for election
and reelection. “In addition, substantially reduced budgetary resources
since the economic recession of 2008–2009 have exacerbated problems
in civil case processing in many state courts.” 160
E. The State Courts Have Been Experimenting With Better Rules and
Methods for Civil Litigation—and They Should Continue To Do So

The previous portions of this Article force one to conclude, we believe, that it does not make sense for the state courts automatically to
adopt amendments or changes to federal procedure, whether they were
brought about by formal Rule amendments or judicial decisions. Those
who have promulgated the changes have not had the needs of state
courts in mind, and for the most part they have been motivated by
large scale, complex litigation in which they perceive that discovery is
excessive. The Supreme Court’s understanding of the Rules Enabling
Act that authorized the Supreme Court to promulgate uniform federal
rules has been that the same federal procedural rules must apply to all
cases, regardless of substance or size. As we have seen, this has added
multiple steps and points of judicial discretion that do not make sense
for the bulk of federal litigation. Such time consuming and expensive
additional steps, and such non-defining standards that have been
introduced (such as “sufficiency of evidence” at the summary judgment
stage, “plausibility” at the pleading stage, and “proportional” at the
discovery stage) do not seem necessary or helpful for most state civil
cases. Moreover, the state courts do not have the personnel to preside
over the multiple conferences that have been introduced into federal
procedure (such as scheduling and pre-trial conferences), nor do they
have the resources to decide preliminary dispositive motions in large
numbers of cases.
The state empirical survey previously referred to demonstrates that
state court judges and attorneys who practice before them have
recognized such state limitations. For instance, where summary judgment motions have come to be a central part of federal litigation, they

159. Posner, supra note 148, at 38.
160. Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, supra note 107, at iii. See generally Dianne
Molvig, Court Funding: Security at Risk, Wis. Law. (Jan. 1, 2016),
http://www.wisbar.org/newspublications/wisconsinlawyer/pages/
article.aspx?Volume=89&Issue=1&ArticleID=24549 [https://perma.cc/
5XET-XWNV] (noting that when states lose funding, the burden often shifts
to county budgets, which have even less money, compromising justice and
court security).
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represent only one percent of the dispositions in the states. 161 One reason the many formalities and steps of federal procedure have not taken
hold at the state level is probably because so much of state civil
litigation proceeds without lawyers for at least one party. “One of the
most striking findings in the dataset was the relatively large portion of
cases (76%) in which at least one party was self-represented, usually
the defendant.” 162 In about half of the state cases (forty-six percent) a
judgment was entered that most of the time was probably a default
judgment. 163
The state survey points out how much procedural experimentation
is already taking place at the state level, notably in California, Georgia,
Colorado, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Texas. “For example, some
states have designated and implemented programs targeting specific
types of cases, especially related to business, commercial, or complex
litigation.” 164 Many states have varied the amount of discovery permitted for lower stakes cases. 165 These reforms have received tragically
little attention in academic circles, which tend to focus exclusively on
federal procedure.
Importantly, the states have important advantages over the federal
system when it comes to experimenting with ways to improve the litigation of civil cases. In many, if not most, instances they will not be
constrained by the sense that the rules must be trans-substantive.
Moreover, they can gear their procedures to the specific needs and
cultures of their states. Different regions of the country have
“distinctive political and institutional properties that depart from the
federal model in important ways.” 166 Also, the methods for achieving
procedural change at the state level may be less cumbersome than at
the federal level, permitting more ease of experimentation and change,
if what is tried proves unsatisfactory.
Also noteworthy is that the state survey showed that state cases
are resolved by trial 3.5% of the time, 167 significantly more than the one
161. Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, supra note 107, at iv.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 4.
165. See, e.g., Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay
on Adjusting the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, supra note 26, at 394 &
nn.74–75 (noting various states have different tracks for discovery, allowing
smaller cases to be expedited through the process more efficiently).
166. See, e.g., Burbank, Farhang & Kritzer, supra note 76, at 714 (citations
omitted) (referring to what students of legislative regulatory policy have
found).
167. Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, supra note 107, at 25. Only 0.1% were
jury trials. Id.
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percent of current federal civil litigation. We have written extensively
elsewhere on the importance of trials and juries to American democracy. 168 Perhaps the federal system can learn from the states what procedural methods make it more possible for the citizenry, judges, and
legal profession to gain the benefits accruing from actual trials. By
having the states experiment with different procedural models and
tracks, perhaps one can learn that some states are not only efficient, in
terms of cost and delay in the processing of cases, but also at the same
time are able to conduct a higher percentage of trials, many of which
are jury trials.
Justice Brandeis was correct. 169 One advantage of our federal
system is the ability of states to experiment and to teach the rest of the
country, including the federal judiciary, what they have learned. All
should remember that the Second Era of American civil procedure was
initiated by reforms to state, not federal procedure; namely, the Field
Code. Perhaps the Fifth Era will likewise emanate from the states.

Conclusion: The High Stakes in the Question of
Whether the State Courts Should Replicate
Federal Procedure
This Article has provided a number of reasons why the state courts
should not adopt the changes to federal procedure that have occurred
in the past quarter century. Nevertheless, questions more profound than
mere replication lurk. Specifically, how do state judges view the place
of civil litigation in our democracy? And how do state judges view their
roles?
Historically in the United States, civil litigation had numerous
functions, in addition to resolving disputes without the parties engaging
in violence. After all, one could resolve disputes by flipping coins or
rolling dice. But our country, especially in the last half century, has
chosen to use private lawyers bringing civil lawsuits to define and
168. E.g., Subrin & Main, supra note 1; Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin,
Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 399 (2011) ([T]rials in open court resulting in decisions
by either a judge or a jury have been thought to be constitutive of American
democracy.”); Main, supra note 10. For an especially eloquent defense of the
importance of the jury trial in our country, see Sheldon Whitehouse, Opening
Address, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1517 (2014) (opening a University of
Pennsylvania conference commemorating the 75th anniversary of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure).
169. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.”).
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enforce public norms and social policy. As Burbank and Farhang have
documented, Congress used fee-shifting and damages-multipliers to help
create a private bar that would enforce public law through civil
litigation; the alternative, of course, was a dramatic increase in federal
executive bureaucracy. 170 Discovery, so ridiculed by anti-litigation
rhetoric, has been a vital part of the ability to use civil law suits to
enforce law. 171
Our democracy has also valued trials in open court as a means of
permitting our citizens to air and decide their grievances. 172 Civil litigation, especially through the use of juries, has been important in providing community input to the application of somewhat amorphous
concepts, such as reasonableness, proximate cause, intent, bad faith,
unfair competition, and discriminatory intent. 173 Juries also educate the
public about the importance of the rule of law, permit lay citizen
participation in governance, and provide some break on concentrated
power; the Constitution enshrines a right that society long has cherished. 174 Yet federal procedure has diminished the importance of trials
and juries in favor of a process of decision-making that is bureaucratic
and opaque. Do state judges want to contribute to this diminution of
the importance of trials and juries? 175
Of equal importance, and in concert with the diminution of the
American trial and the American jury, the historic roles of judges in
the United States have been dramatically altered and reduced. It was
previously thought that the primary role of judges was to preside over
170. Burbank & Farhang, supra note 10, at 1547–51 (discussing the “rise of the
litigation state”); see also Sean Farhang, The Litigation State: Public
Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the U.S. (2010) (arguing that
governmental regulation created today’s reliance on private litigation for
dispute resolution).
171. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Proportionality and the Social Benefits of
Discovery: Out of Sight and Out of Mind?, 34 Rev. Litig. 647 (2015)
(describing the various social benefits of discovery).
172. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, The Contingency of Openness in Courts: Changing
the Experiences and Logics of the Public’s Role in Court-Based ADR, 15
Nev. L.J. 1631 (2015) (describing the benefits of allowing citizens to
participate in the judicial process).
173. See Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at 1879 & n.229 (citing Burbank & Subrin,
supra note 168, at 401–02 (2011)) (discussing the importance of the
citizenry’s role in deciding questions of mixed fact and law).
174. See, e.g., Whitehouse, supra note 168 (arguing the multiple benefits of a
civil jury); Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at 1880–84 (stating that citizens
can help answer mixed questions of fact and law while keeping those
powerful members of society on an “equal footing”).
175. Subrin & Main, supra note 1 (discussing the changing characteristics of the
civil docket that may explain the judiciary’s departure from the use of
trials).

534

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 2·2016
Braking the Rules

trials and to decide motions necessary to promote fair trials. Such roles
contributed to high settlement rates, with little or no further judicial
involvement. 176 Motions to dismiss at the pleading stage or through
summary judgment were extremely rare in federal courts, 177 and
fortunately are apparently not the norm in many state courts today.178
Judges in federal courts have become part of a large bureaucracy and
have, to a large extent, become case managers, with the goal of
disposing of civil cases without trial. Many federal judges feel that the
trial of a case is evidence of judicial failure. 179
The debate on the extent to which state courts should replicate
federal procedure as it has evolved since the 1980s should include, in
our view, what state judges think their judicial roles should be and how
they see the place of civil litigation in our democracy. The state courts
handle about ninety-five percent of the civil caseload in the United
States; the views of state court judges on these critical questions about
the judicial role and the place of civil litigation in our society are of
momentous importance.
It is important that the state courts, for the most part, have an
advantage over the federal system when it comes to procedural rules.
They are not bound by a “one size fits all” constriction. They have the
opportunity to devise rule-bound systems, with clear cut-off times and
discovery amounts, whereby the bulk of cases can be litigated with few
procedural steps and hurdles, while larger cases can be judicially managed on a more hands-on basis. They have the opportunity to experiment with different procedures for different case-types and to determine
whether some cases would benefit from such crafting. At the same time,
state judges have the opportunity to embrace their historic roles as
judges.

176. Id. at 1885. See also Main, supra note 10, at 1624.
177. Id. at 1844–45.
178. Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, supra note 107, at 35. For example, there
were 5,815 dispositions by summary judgment in the 820,893 dispositions. It
is uncertain what number of dispositions in the survey were based on granted
dismissals at the pleading stage, but given the nature of the bulk of the cases,
it is not likely to be a high percentage.
179. Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at 1861–62, 1873–74.
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Exhibit A: Replication of Federal Amendments by States that have
Adopted the FRCP
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